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Abstract Personal data has become a central asset for
multiple enterprise applications and online services of-
fered by private companies, public organisations or a
combination of both. The sensitivity of such data and
the continuously growing legislation that accompanies
their management dictate the development of methods
that allow the development of more secure, trustwor-
thy software systems with focus on privacy protection.
The contribution of this paper is the definition of a
novel requirements engineering method that supports
both early and late requirements specification, giving
emphasis on security, privacy and trust. The novelty
of our work is that it provides the means for software
designers and security experts to analyse the system-to-
be from multiple aspects, starting from identifying high
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level goals to the definition of business process composi-
tion, and elicitation of mechanisms to fortify the system
from external threats. The method is supported by two
CASE tools. To demonstrate the applicability and use-
fulness of our work, the paper shows its applications to
a real-world case study.
Keywords Security · Privacy · Trust · sociotechnical
systems · CASE tools
1 Introduction
Software engineers have always been challenged while
capturing the intentions of stakeholders and analysing
them in order to understand the problem for which they
should provide a solution. The efforts to address this
challenge led, as a result, to the foundation of Require-
ments Engineering (RE). An accurate definition for RE,
which has been provided by Zave [97], is the following:
‘Requirements engineering is the branch of software en-
gineering concerned with the real-world goals for, func-
tions of, and constraints on software systems. It is also
concerned with the relationship of these factors to pre-
cise specifications of software behaviour, and to their
evolution over time and across software families’.
Research in the area of RE has provided well estab-
lished approaches for capturing requirements such as
the Unified Modelling Language (UML) [70] that fol-
lows an object oriented approach to model the problem
described by the stakeholders. Goal-oriented require-
ments analysis [55] is a different approach of modelling
the stakeholders’ intentions for the system. Numerous
general purpose goal-oriented modelling languages [4,
11,16,34,57,93] have been proposed over the years, fo-
cusing on different aspects of the RE process, e.g., cap-
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turing social interactions, handling conflicting require-
ments, reasoning about alternative solutions.
The RE process is composed of two fundamental
phases, the early requirements [95], where the organi-
sational objectives of the system are specified, and the
late requirements [45], where the functional aspects of
the system that will meet the early requirements, are
specified. In other words, the first phase focuses on the
description of the problem the system-to-be will solve,
whereas the latter captures the details of the solution.
Frequently, the description of the problem includes or-
ganisational aspects, while the details of the solution
includes concepts related to the software that has to be
developed. For example, organisational aspects can be a
requirement for anonymisation due to the movement of
a dataset among companies, while the details of the so-
lution can be a specific anonymisation technique. There
is lack of methods to generate the specification of the
expected functionality of the software system in terms
of privacy, security, and trust, from the high level de-
scription of the security, privacy, and trust requirements
respectively, that considers also the benefits of specific
functionalities, and their implications to the rest of the
system.
The aforementioned approaches usually cover only
one of the two phases and, often, partially. This prob-
lem forces software designers to use multiple tools for
providing a complete description of their design, that
might not be related to each other, increasing the ef-
fort of learning how to use them and decreasing the
final output’s cohesion.
In addition to this issue in RE, during the last years,
security, privacy, and trust gained a central position in
software design, since consequences of unsecured sys-
tems are no more affordable by organisations and com-
panies, and the earlier the security and privacy prob-
lems are discovered the lesser the consequences are.
Moreover, new regulations, such as the General Data
Protection Regulation (GDPR) [82], impose stricter con-
straints and higher sanctions. In particular, GDPR en-
forced by the European Union (EU) in May 2018 and
all companies and organisations that manage personal
data of citizens or customers are obliged to follow it.
Privacy and security are aspects to be considered during
the early requirements engineering phases and exten-
sions of the aforementioned goal-oriented approaches [62,
53,46] have been proposed to address security issues in
software systems. These approaches enable the identifi-
cation of external threats, vulnerabilities of the system-
to-be and reasoning about counter-measures to miti-
gate them. There are also other approaches that allow
analysing trust between interdependent components of
a system [13,63], which has become a common phe-
nomenon as the scale of modern software systems keeps
increasing. However, there are no approaches that tackle
all the dimensions, security, privacy and trust, raising
the same issues we mentioned earlier.
In this work we propose a novel method, named
SePTA (Security, Privacy and Trust Approach), that
supports a unified specification of security, privacy and
trust requirements under one framework and enables
software designers and security experts to enforce such
requirements. SePTA is designed for sociotechnical sys-
tems, i.e. complex information systems such as the ones
of public administrations and large companies, where
there is an interplay between people and autonomous
technical components that collaborate in order to achieve
common objectives.
In this paper we focus on how security, privacy and
trust requirements can be specified in early require-
ment phase using a goal-based modelling language, and
how such requirements can be correctly enforced in the
late requirement phase, using goal-based modelling lan-
guages and a modelling language for business processes.
In particular, we adopted a business process modelling
language for the definition of the late requirements since
it can be used as a specification of how goals can be
achieved.
More specifically, our work integrates and extends
work from security, privacy and trust modelling lan-
guages to provide a method that introduces the fol-
lowing original contributions: i) provides a holistic re-
quirements modelling and analysis approach that also
includes security, privacy and trust requirements, sup-
porting both early and late requirements elicitation; ii)
provides a software tool that offers automated function-
alities that reduce the effort of the designers, by not
having to repeat modelling tasks in order to analyse a
different aspect of the system; iii) facilitates the solution
discovery in terms of security and privacy, by provid-
ing patterns that address common issues; iv) provides
a method to enforce privacy and security requirements.
Finally, we illustrate the application of the proposed ap-
proach and its benefits through a real-world case study
from the domain of e-government.
The rest of this paper is organised as it follows: Sec-
tion 2 describes the research framework used for the cre-
ation of SePTA, Section 3 presents the baseline of our
work. Then, Section 4 describes in detail the SePTA
method. Next, Section 5 shows how we apply SePTA
on a real-world case study, while Section 6 presents the
related work. Finally, Section 7 concludes the paper.
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2 Method design
This section describes how we designed SePTA, using
the design science approach defined by Hevner et al.
in [32], with the following sections: (i) problem rele-
vance, which highlights the importance of the problem
that our approach addresses; (ii) research rigour, which
describes the validity of the baseline of SePTA; (iii) de-
sign and research process, where the process used to
create the method proposed in this paper, is defined;
(iv) artefact, which highlights the outcomes described
in this paper; (v) design evaluation, where we explain
how SePTA has been evaluated; (vi) research contribu-
tion, which defines the contribution and the novelty of
the proposal of this paper; while (vii) research commu-
nication describes how we communicate the content of
our research work.
2.1 Problem relevance
As described in the introduction, it is extremely im-
portant to consider security and privacy during the re-
quirements phase of sociotechical systems. However, as
far as our knowledge goes, no method covers the en-
tire requirement engineering process, from the defini-
tion of early requirements to late requirements. Conse-
quently, security and privacy experts are forced to use
multiple approaches [58] and this leads to conceptual
and methodological gaps that result into consequences
that span from requirements misaligned, to early re-
quirements not enforced that, once (not) implemented,
which leads to breaches that affect systems’ security
and/or users’ privacy. Moreover, the satisfaction of se-
curity and privacy requirements is often assigned to hu-
man actors or to external systems, where there is no
assurance that these entities will behave as expected.
Therefore, there are a lot of trust assumptions about
the satisfaction of security and privacy requirements
that are made during the design of a system that remain
overlooked [64]. These assumptions may be wrong and
during the operation of the system will lead to security
and privacy breaches.
2.2 Research rigour
The approach defined in this paper is based on four
modelling languages: STS-ml[15], SecBPMN2 [75], Tro-
pos [53] and JTrust [63]. Each language covers strate-
gic aspects of early or late requirements. All modelling
languages have been thoroughly validated using real
case studies [20]. Moreover, the syntax of the STS-ml
and SecBPMN2 languages has been formally defined
[15] [75], while SecTro and JTrust have been semi-
formally defined [53] [63]. Meta-models and detailed
guidelines exist that can support the software designer
in the development of the relevant models. The chosen
baseline of SePTA offers a solid research foundation.
2.3 Design and research process
We defined as target users of SePTA security and pri-
vacy experts with a deep knowledge on the domain
where the system will be deployed. We decided to in-
volve the target users of the method directly in its defi-
nition. This decision allowed immediate feedback which
eased the creation of an effective framework, based on
experience of the users. The users involved were selected
from heterogeneous domains such as health care, pub-
lic administration and private IT companies, in order
to avoid to be influenced by domain specific issues and
requirements.
The creation of SePTA followed an iterative process
where, in each iteration, the involved stakeholders eval-
uated the design of the method and the fulfilment of its
requirements.
During the initial stage we interviewed a group of
target users from different domains in order to define
the initial set of requirements for the method [27]. We
identified five main requirements, relevant to SePTA: (i)
the method shall support security experts in identify-
ing security and privacy requirements and in proposing
security mechanisms to enforce them; (ii) the method
shall facilitate the detection of weak trust relationships
among the stakeholders of the system-to-be and re-
fine the design in order to strengthen them; (iii) the
method shall help users to move between different per-
spectives (i.e. security, privacy and trust perspectives)
and between different level of abstractions (i.e. between
goal diagrams and business process diagrams); (iv) the
method shall be supported by a software that helps the
users to analyse the models and check security, privacy
and trust properties; (v) the method shall help users
dealing with large sociotechnical systems, such as the
ones of public administrations and large companies.
2.4 Artefact
The outcome of the design process, and what is de-
scribed in this paper, is the SePTA method, which is
composed of a process used to guide users in the defini-
tion of security, privacy and trust requirements, and a
software tool that supports this process with graphical
editors for the modelling language and automated veri-
fication engines for the analysis of security, privacy and
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trust properties. The process commences after the ac-
tivity of requirements elicitation, for which a range of
available techniques already exist, such as interviews,
document analysis, and questionnaires.
SePTA is a middle-range theory, as defined by
Wieringa and Daneva in [89]. Therefore, it has no uni-
versal scope. In fact, it targets, and it is limited to
sociotechnical systems, where human and autonomous
components interact to achieve common objectives. In
particular, it can be used during the early and late re-
quirements phase of the design of such systems, where
security and privacy experts need to perform both se-
curity, privacy and trust analyses.
2.5 Design evaluation
The involvement of targeted users in the creation of
SePTA allowed us to evaluate the proposed method
during its design and implementation. Moreover, once
the method was released, we asked target users to ap-
ply SePTA in real world case studies [20]. In partic-
ular, the method was evaluated using three scenarios
that represent three very different domains: (i) public
administration; (ii) healthcare; and (iii) a private IT
company. More information on the case study from the
public administration domain is presented in Section 5.
2.6 Research contribution
The research contribution consists the framework as a
set of guidelines for security and privacy experts and
a set of model transformations that allow to automat-
ically generate one model from another and, therefore,
to facilitate experts in aligning early and late security
and privacy requirements.
2.7 Research communication
This is a scientific publication, therefore, the commu-
nication style is technical and is aimed for an academic
audience. However, especially during introduction, the
discussion is less technical and we motivate the paper
with real case examples in order to address a wider set
of readers, such as IT experts and security and privacy
engineers.
3 Baseline
Three of the four approaches we chose for modelling
and analysing security, privacy and trust requirements,
i.e. STS-ml, SecTro and JTrust, are based on a com-
bination of modelling languages that are built on the
foundations of Tropos [11] and i∗ [93]. These two mod-
elling languages combine Goal Oriented Requirements
Engineering (GORE) with organisational and social as-
pects for designing a system.
We chose to use goal-based modelling languages
since they are focused on the social relations among
actors. This is an aspect that is central in early and
late requirements in complex systems, such as the ones
targeted by SePTA.
The fourth modelling language, i.e. SecBPMN2, is
used for specifying security constraints of procedu-
ral aspects of systems. In particular, it is based on
BPMN 2.0 [59], a well known standard notation for
modelling business processes. We selected a procedural-
based modelling language, since it permits to specify
how the goals, defined in the goal-based modelling lan-
guages, can be achieved.
One of our objectives consisted in minimising the
effort of SePTA users. We, therefore, avoided to cre-
ate yet another set of new modelling languages and,
instead, we adopted well known ones. Before select-
ing goal-based (STS-ml, SecTro and JTrust) and pro-
cedural (SecBPMN2) modelling languages, we exam-
ined other classes of languages, such as UML class dia-
gram, Fault Tree Analysis (FTA), use cases and misuse
cases. In particular, UML [60] class diagram is a widely
used modelling language, however its scope (modelling
of classes) targets the implementation of software and
not the definition of social interactions between actors
of sociotechnical systems. FTA [42] and attack trees [47]
approaches and modelling languages allow to define se-
curity attacks on the system and possible mitigations.
However, such modelling languages cannot be used for
the analysis of the interaction between actors in so-
ciotechnical systems. Use case [9] and misuse case [3]
modelling languages are actor-centred and define the
(mis)usage of functionalities of the systems-to-be. Un-
fortunately, they do not define the interactions between
actors of a system, but only the interactions between
users and the system-to-be.
For a detailed comparison of goal-based mod-
elling languages and BPMN based modelling languages,
please refer to Section 6.
In this section we present the fundamental concepts
that our work inherits from Tropos, i∗and BPMN 2.0,
while we explain their role in the requirements engi-
neering process.
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3.1 Goal Modelling
Goals state the intentions of stakeholders of a system-
to-be and their satisfaction depends on actors or soft-
ware components that compose it. More specifically,
in the terminology of Tropos and i∗, goals represent
functional requirements. A goal can be refined to more
detailed goals (aka subgoals) using AND/OR refine-
ments that follow Boolean Logic, forming acyclic di-
rected graphs. Requirement engineers refine goals un-
til the produced subgoals represent definite operations
that can be executed either by a software component
or a human that is part of the system-to-be. Similarly,
non-functional requirements are represented by soft-
goals [14]. Such requirements capture qualities of the
system-to-be that lack clear-cut criteria for their ful-
filment, satisfied or not, whereas goals are satisfied or
not.
The achievement of goals may require or may pro-
duce various resources in the system. For instance, in
the case study that we will examine in the next sec-
tions, the Municipality of Athens (MoA) has as a goal
to publish birth certificates. The achievement of this
goal creates the resource, birth certificate, which, de-
pending on the modelling language, can be referred also
as a document. These resources are transmitted within
the system-to-be raising security concerns, as we will
see in the following sections.
The languages that constitute the baseline of this
work support the representation of social relationships.
The fundamental concept of such relationship is, in Tro-
pos terminology, the Actor. This concept represents a
physical agent (e.g., a human) or a software component.
Actors have goals and often depend on each other to
fulfil theirs. Such a relationship between two actors is
named dependency, the actor that relies on an other is
referred as depender and the latter as dependee. Given
that not every actor is reliable, dependencies in a sys-
tem might lead to unsatisfied goals because a dependee
didn’t fulfil what was expected, causing the depender
not to fulfil their own goals, creating a reaction of fail-
ures. Consequently, dependencies must concern the sys-
tem designers with respect to the reliability and trust-
worthiness of the dependees. In this work we address
such issues with trust analysis.
3.2 Business Process Modelling
In our approach we consider procedural aspects that
can be used to specify organisational details of the
system-to-be, such as the sequence of activities exe-
cuted and the privacy and security constraints when
such activities are executed. In particular, we focused
on business processes, i.e. sequences of activities exe-
cuted to achieve a business objective.
One of the most known and used modelling language
for documenting business process is the Business Pro-
cess Modelling and Notation (BPMN) standard. BPMN
2.0 [59] is the last version of the standard and specifies
a rich and expressive modelling language. However, the
basic concepts are simple yet effective. There are four
main types of elements: activities, gateways, events and
data objects, that are described in the rest of the sec-
tion.
Activities are atomic set of instructions. The order of
activity is specified with a control flow, that is repre-
sented with an arrow that connects two activities whose
target activity is executed after the source activity.
Gateways specify forks in the sequence of activities.
The Exclusive Gateway represents an evaluation of a
statement, based on which one set of activities is ex-
ecuted instead of another one. The Parallel Gateway
specifies that a set of activities is executed at the same
time.
Events specify something that happens. The start of a
business process and reception of a message are exam-
ples of two events.
Data Objects refer to containers of information that
are used and/or produced by activities when they are
executed.
4 The SePTA method
In this section we illustrate the motivation of our work
and we present the Security, Privacy and Trust Ap-
proach (SePTA) to support the RE process in both
early and late requirements specification.
SePTA involves four modelling languages, STS-
ml [15], SecBPMN2 [75], Secure Tropos (SecTro) [53]
and JTrust [63], each of them focusing on different
aspects of the system and collaboratively enable de-
signers analyse security and privacy requirements and
examine the validity of trust relationships within the
system-to-be. STS-ml and SecBPMN2 are implemented
by the STS-tool1, whereas Secure Tropos and JTrust
by the SecTro tool2 and can be used for facilitating
the modelling of organisational aspects of sociotechni-
cal systems, performing security analysis and capturing
trust relationships, respectively. In our work we com-
bine these tools by implementing transformations that
allow these tools to exchange models and contribute by
satisfying a subset of the requirements presented in the
previous section. The purpose of combining these tools
1http://www.sts-tool.eu/
2www.sense-brighton.eu/research/sectro-tool
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is to cover all the aspects of software designing every
phase of the RE process.
4.1 Early Requirements
SocioTechnical Security (STS) [15] is a method focused
on specifying early security requirements of sociotechni-
cal systems. STS uses STS-ml, a goal-based modelling
language that allows to specify components of a sys-
tem, called Actors, their interactions and their privacy
and security requirements.
STS-ml is a multi-view modelling language: it per-
mits to specify a system from three perspectives. Each
one highlights different properties of a sociotechnical
system and it allows to easily define large systems. The
three views supported by STS-ml are: (i) the social
view, which is used to represent the objective of ac-
tors of a system; (ii) the information view, which is
used to specify the content of documents exchanged be-
tween actors; (iii) the authorisation view, which is used
to represent the flows of authorisations between actors.
All views permit to specify two types of Actors: (i) Agent,
which characterises a specific autonomous component;
(ii) Role, which specifies an unknown (set of) compo-
nents. For example, George is an agent and citizen is a role,
since the former identifies a specific individual while the
latter specifies a generic set of individuals, i.e. all the
citizens.
STS-ml is focused on the social relationships among
actors of a system. The assets it considers using this
perspective are the interactions between actors. From
our experience, the focus on such interactions helps
security and privacy experts during the early require-
ments phase of a sociotechnical system. Consequently,
the security requirements that can be defined using
STS-ml target such relations. However, for the level of
abstraction required in this phase, our stakeholders con-
firmed that the set of requirements that can be specified
with STS-ml covers their security needs.
In the following, the three views of STS-ml are de-
scribed.
Social View. The social view supports the specifica-
tion of Goals of each Actor and delegations of goals. Fur-
thermore, this view allows the specification how Docu-
ments, i.e. tangible entities, are used to store and trans-
fer knowledge. Figure 2 shows an example of STS-ml
social view; in the image the ID card is a document that
can be used by the citizen or transmitted from the citizen
to the MoA.
Information View. The information view is centred
on the concept Information. An information, in STS-ml,
is an intangible element, which represents a piece of
knowledge, and it is stored in a document. Figure 3
shows an example of STS-ml information view; in the
example, name and surname are two Information elements
that are stored in an ID card Document. In the informa-
tion view is possible to specify the set of information
stored in each document.
Authorisation View. The authorisation view is used
to specify the permissions granted between actors, for
the usage of information. Each authorisation is com-
posed of three parts: (i) the set of information, target of
the authorisation, (ii) the operations (among read, modify,
produce and transmit) that are allowed to be executed
on the set of information, and (iii) the set of goals for
which the authorisation is granted. Figure 4 shows an
example of STS-ml information view; in the image a cit-
izen authorises the MoA to read and modify the informa-
tion family name only for achieving the goal of providing
their birth certificate.
4.2 Late Requirements
In the second phase of the RE process, the designer
must refine the initial requirements to more detailed
ones. At this point, both stakeholders and designers
have a more clear view of how the system-to-be will
be structured and express additional requirements that
are more system-specific. Modern agile software devel-
opment approaches allow also early [85] or parallel [5]
composition of the systems architecture which can be
derived from the models of the previous phase. With
this in mind, SePTA allows the specification of STS-
ml model to a more detailed one, using Secure Tropos
and JTrust that provide three additional views: a) Secu-
rity Requirements view, b)Attacks view, c) Trust view.
The Procedural view is supported by SecBPMN2. The
transformations of the STS-ml concepts to Secure Tro-
pos and JTrust concepts are depicted in Table 1, while
the transformation from STS-ml to SecBPMN2 is de-
scribed in [75].
The transformations of the models is supported by
the software tool, provided with the method, in a semi-
automated fashion. STS-ml diagrams are the first to be
designed and, therefore, they cannot be generated, the
other diagrams are then derived from the STS-ml mod-
els. After that, users will have to enrich the models,
by using the concepts peculiar of the modelling lan-
guage they want to use. For example, the software can
automatically generate partial business processes from
STS-ml diagrams, after that the user will have to en-
rich the business processes diagrams to create complete
models.
Security Requirements View. The Security Re-
quirements view displays agents and roles which are
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STS SecTro & JTrust
Agent\Role Actor
Goal Goal
Document Resource
Delegation Security Dependency
AND\OR AND\OR
Table 1 Concept Transformations
referred as actors in the SecTro Notation, and their goals.
In STS-ml there is distinction between agents and roles,
as this language examines the system at an organisa-
tional level. However, Secure Tropos and JTrust anal-
yse the system at an operational level and therefore,
the nature of the entities involved in the system is not
important. This has led to the decision to maintain the
term of actor in Secure Tropos which represents both
agents and roles.
SecTro enables software designers to add new goals
and refine existing ones to plan, clear-cut operations
that cannot be refined any further and are achieved by
an actor of the system-to-be. Next, the security and pri-
vacy requirements specified over the delegations in STS-
ml are transformed to Constraints, a central concept of
this view. A Constraint is a restriction on an actor’s func-
tion and can be either security or privacy related. For
instance, if an actor has a goal of sending a confidential
information to another actor, this goal shall be restricted
by a security related constraint sender-confidentiality. Ad-
ditionally, a constraint is related to an objective that
needs to be fulfilled, such as confidentiality, integrity,
authentication, etc. In this case, this goal is confidential-
ity. Constraints are satisfied by introducing mechanisms,
system components that address security and/or pri-
vacy concerns in a system.
From a system design perspective, the purpose of
a constraint is to indicate that the components that
will fulfil the restricted goal should include counter-
measures to external threats. In particular, a threat is
a circumstance that could potentially cause damage
to the system, such as information disclosure, tampering,
spoofing to name some. A common approach to iden-
tify threats is STRIDE [78], which proposes six basic
classes of threats and a systematic approach to iden-
tify them. However, the number of available threats in
real world is continuously growing and new threats are
continuously being documented.
When a threat is identified, mechanisms are proposed
as counter-measures to mitigate it. A mechanism rep-
resents a software component or policy that must be
implemented or adopted respectively, in order to ful-
fil a constraint. The identification of such mechanisms
requires expertise, both in the domain of the system-
to-be and security. As a result, proposing mechanisms
can be a cumbersome process. In our approach, we have
created a pattern library, where each pattern is a com-
position of alternative mechanisms that address various
privacy-related Objectives that reduce the designer’s ef-
fort. At the moment, the library includes only mech-
anisms, and not architectures, that mitigate privacy
threats.
In particular, our library offers an implementation
of previous work [18] that covers five basic privacy prop-
erties [67] that every data-centric sociotechnical system
should satisfy. These properties and potential mecha-
nisms that fulfil them are listed below.
– Anonymity. A system that satisfies this property
should not permit the identification, direct or in-
direct, of a user by those who have access to this
data. Anonymity can be achieved with the use of
anonymisation services, such as virtual e-mail ad-
dresses and onion-routing, or with the use of track
and evident erasers, such as spyware detection and
removal software.
– Pseudonimity. A system that satisfies this property
should guarantee that all entities associated with
the data stored by or transferred through the sys-
tem are not identifiable and alias is used instead of
their real identity. This property can be achieved
with the use of administrative tools such as smart
cards, biometrics, or pseudonimiser tools, such as
Mixmaster.
– Unlinkability. A system that satisfies this property
should guarantee that when a user makes multiple
uses of multiple resources of the system, relating
these uses cannot reveal the user’s identity. This
property can be achieved with the use of anonymiser
products (e.g., Tor, Hordes, GAP, etc), pseudon-
imiser tools or track and evident erasers.
– Undetectability. A system that satisfies this property
should guarantee that a third party cannot distin-
guish whether a specific entity is a user of the sys-
tem or not. This property can be achieved with the
use of encryption, anononymiser tools, administra-
tive tools, etc.
– Unobservability. A system that satisfies this prop-
erty should guarantee that a user cannot be dis-
tinguished from the other users who belong in the
same set while using the system. This property can
be achieved with the use of administrative tools,
anonymiser products, etc.
As it concerns security related mechanisms, the
range of mechanisms is significantly higher than the
privacy related ones. For this type of mechanisms there
is guidance available for the designers in selecting
mechanisms. This guidance is in the form of secu-
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rity patterns [77] or online databases, such as the
Common Attack Pattern Enumeration and Classifica-
tion3 (CAPEC) and the Top 10 and Proactive Con-
trols projects from the Open Web Application Security
Project (OWASP)4.
Attacks View. Each Threat identified in the Security
Requirements view can be further analysed in a sepa-
rate view, namely Attacks view. The role of this view is
to further analyse how a threat can be manifested and
what are the specific vulnerabilities of the system-to-be.
The main two concepts of this view is the attack method,
which represents a method that a threat can be mani-
fested and the vulnerability, a weakness of a system com-
ponent or organisation. An attack method is performed
by a malicious actor, named ‘Attacker’ and can be re-
fined in the same manner goals do, using AND/OR. The
purpose of attacks is to exploit vulnerabilities that are
associated with goals or resources of the system. This
view belongs to the late requirements phase because, in
order to identify vulnerabilities, the architecture of the
system must has already been drafted. The vulnerabil-
ity detection requires domain knowledge and investiga-
tion by security engineers who usually rely on continu-
ously update resources, such as the Common Vulnera-
bility and Exposures (CVE) knowledge base5.
Trust View. In sociotechnical systems, where the ful-
filment of certain goals depend on human actors, of-
ten doubts are created on the fact if such actors will
act according to the system’s design or not. Hence, the
trust, defined as the positive expectation of one actor
from another that a specific goal assigned to the latter,
will be fulfilled [56], must be analysed before proceed-
ing to the system’s implementation. This means that,
in case of dependencies, the trust of the depender on
the dependee (also referred as trustor and trustee, re-
spectively) for the fulfilment of a specific goal should be
examined. Therefore, trust on one actor is not the same
for all the goals that the actor is assigned to fulfill, but
it varies depending on the specific goal [65]. The same
actor can be trusted for one goal to be fulfilled, but
they may not be trusted for another goal. Such a goal
can be to satisfy a security or a privacy requirement.
The role, therefore, of this view is to support the soft-
ware designer in analysing methodically and in detail
on what type of trust the decision, of whether to trust
an actor to satisfy a security or a privacy requirement,
was made. In previous work [63], four types of trust
have been identified within the context of sociotech-
incal systems. The first type is named experiential trust
and originates from previous experience of the depender
3https://capec.mitre.org/
4https://www.owasp.org/index.php/Main_Page
5https://cve.mitre.org/
with the dependee, i.e. the dependee has repeatedly ful-
filled the same or similar goal in the past. The second
type of trust is the reported trust which originates from
a third party who reports that the dependee is trust-
worthee. Next, the normative trust is a type of trust that
originates from the system environment norm, e.g., a
set of law or regulations that enforce the dependee to
fulfil its goal. The last type of trust is the external trust,
which originates from sources outside the environment
of the system, e.g., governments or other authorities.
These four types of trust represent direct trust rela-
tionships and are able to resolve dependencies between
a depender and a dependee for the fulfilment of a se-
curity or a privacy requirement. In cases where there
is no trust, the software designer has to choose a so-
lution where the system should be implemented in a
way to force the fulfilment of the security or privacy
requirements.
Procedural View. Ultimately, goals are opera-
tionalised by defining sets of instructions to be executed
in order to achieve such goals. In particular, in require-
ment engineering, goals are frequently operationalised
using business processes. In the literature there are
many methods for defining business processes with se-
curity aspects [75], however, as far as our knowledge
goes, the most expressive, in terms of security aspects
that can be expressed, and the most complete, in terms
of security constraints, is SecBPMN2 [75]. It consists of:
(i) SecBPMN2-ml, a modelling language that allows to
specify business processes, security and privacy proper-
ties on such processes; (ii) SecBPMN2-Q, a modelling
language that permits to specify security and privacy
patterns (referred as security policies in SecBPMN2);
(iii) a software that automates the analysis of security
policies against business processes. Using SecBPMN2,
designers and security experts can specify eleven dif-
ferent security concepts such as confidentiality, avail-
ability and integrity, and more specific ones such as
non-repudiation. We selected this method and its mod-
elling languages for the definition of business process in
SePTA.
4.3 Process Overview
The modelling capabilities of the modelling languages
we mentioned above allow designers to elicit the re-
quirements of a sociotechnical system and build gradu-
ally its architecture with focus on security, privacy and
trust. Each view of the aforementioned tools examine
the system-to-be from a different angle and a different
level of detail. From a technical point of view, all dia-
grams are stored in a database from where each tool can
retrieve and process them. The external storage of the
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diagrams facilitates the exchange of information among
the tools.
Figure 1 shows the process that SePTA user will
execute to perform the analyses. The first step is the
definition of the analysis of early requirements. The first
modelling language to be used is STS-ml, for the “So-
cial/organisational analysis”. Using this modelling lan-
guage, relevant autonomous components of the anal-
ysed system are specified as actors and their objectives
as goals. The interdependencies between actors are de-
fined with delegations of goals and transmissions of docu-
ments. STS-ml is focused on privacy and security needs
of each actor, therefore, it allows to specify security
and privacy requirements in the interactions between
actors. STS-Tool can be used to check automatically
the well-formedness of the diagram and if there are in-
consistencies in the security and privacy specification.
Once software designers and security experts are sat-
isfied with the level of privacy and security specified,
they can export the diagram in the database, in order
to make it available to other tools.
Once the model from STS is complete and stored
to the database, the early security requirements phase
is considered finished and the late security require-
ments phase starts. In this phase, the validation of the
trustworthiness and security of the system-to-be is per-
formed, along with the analysis of procedural aspects.
For what concerns the trustworthiness and security
analyses, a SecTro diagram is generated by the software
that supports SePTA. More specifically, the diagram is
imported, from the shared database, in XML format
and SecTro parses it to detect all the elements that ex-
ist in the diagram. From the STS diagram are imported
the actors, their goals and dependencies as well as the re-
sources (documents and information) that are produced
and exchanged within the system-to-be. Such elements
constitute the initial SecTRO diagram that is generated
by the SePTA software.
After the generation of the SecTro model, the user
performs the “Trust analysis” and the “Security anal-
ysis”. The purpose of the former analyses consists in
examining the trustworthiness of the system-to-be. In
particular, the part of the SecTRO model dedicated
to trust captures what preconditions must hold (re-
ferred as entailments) for an actor to be trusted and
what counter-measures can be introduced in order to
force actors to deliver their mandate. The latter pro-
cess might introduce new actors in the system-to-be with
goals related to the supervision and control of other ac-
tors. All in all, the analysis conducted with the use of
the Trust View detects the weaknesses of the design of
the system-to-be and proposes solutions to them.
The design process continues with the “Security
analysis”. Note that Trust View and Security Require-
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ments View are synchronised. This means that every
time a new actor, goal or resource is added in one view,
so is to the other, decreasing the time required for the
design process. This allows the trust analysis and the
security analysis to be executed in parallel. In addi-
tion to the concepts we mentioned above, every security
and privacy requirement specified in STS is transformed
into a constraint. The role of the designers in this step
of the process is twofold. First, to identify threats that
could harm the system-to-be or prevent it from fulfilling
its mandate and second, to propose defence mechanisms
to protect the system. This is achieved with the use of
the Attack View.
After the “Social/organisational analysis”, the user
performs also a “Procedural enforcement analysis”.
Such analysis is executed in parallel with the trust and
security analysis, since the diagrams used by the two
analyses are independent. STS-Tool integrates STS-
ml and SecBPMN2 modelling languages, supporting a
smooth transition between the STS-ml and SecBPMN2
diagrams. Software designers and security experts, as a
first step, use STS-Tool to automatically generate busi-
ness process diagrams from STS-ml goals and delegations
(“Transform STS-ml in SecBPMN2 diagram” activity
in Figure 1). The generated SecBPMN2 diagrams con-
tain a process for each goal of the STS-ml diagram and
one data object for each document of the STS-ml model.
Delegation and transmission specified in STS-ml model
are transformed in SecBPMN2 processes, as specified
in [73].
The generated business processes will be enriched by
the users of SePTA with SecBPMN2 elements (“Trans-
form STS-ml in SecBPMN2 diagram” activity in Fig-
ure 1) and perform the procedural enforcement analy-
sis (“Procedural enforcement analysis” activity in Fig-
ure 1). The two transformation activities in Figure 1
are partially automated, while the rest of the process is
executed by a team composed by security and privacy
experts.
The process defined in this section is iterative,
meaning that it permits to revise the diagrams multiple
times. The creation of a diagram may let the security
experts to discover new security issues or new aspects
of the system-to-be, that should be included in other
models too.
Overall, STS-ml is useful for understanding and cap-
turing the composition of the system-to-be and identify-
ing its security and privacy requirements in terms of its
organisational structure. Then, Jtrust and SecTro are
used to validate the trustworthiness of the system-to-
be, examine in depth the security and privacy vulner-
abilities and propose mechanisms to enhance the sys-
tem’s security and privacy. Last, the objectives of the
system-to-be and their security aspects are enacted and
enforced in business processes using SecBPMN2.
Within each modelling language of the SEPTA
method, the use of the various relationships between
the entities asserts that one entity has some bearing
on the other entity. This enables forward and backward
traceabilty. In terms of the ability to follow the life of
a specific entity across the whole method in both a for-
ward and backwards direction, there is currently no au-
tomated support, but it can be achieved with manual
intervention by cross referencing the related entities.
4.4 Software support
SePTA is provided with a software framework6 which
helps the users in performing security, privacy and trust
analyses. The software integrates graphical editors for
all the modelling languages provided, and performs au-
tomated analysis to check the well formdness of the
models and security, privacy and trust properties. For
more information on the analyses please refer to the
specific documentation of STS [15], SecBPMN2 [75],
Tropos [53] and JTrust [63].
The integration of STS-tool and SecTro was a chal-
lenging process, both from a conceptual and from a
technical perspective. One of the motivations of this
work was to allow software designers to analyse a
system-to-be from multiple angles with the minimum
effort possible. Therefore, having to redesign all com-
mon concepts for the modelling language would have
a drawback. The advantage of combining these two
tools is that both are built using the Eclipse Modelling
Framework [80] (EMF). This means that both tools
are implemented on the top of a metamodel that de-
scribes the concepts and the relationships among them,
included in the modelling language that the tool imple-
ments. Hence, using the Java API provided by EMF
and the concept mapping we presented in this sec-
tion, we implemented a transformation mechanism in-
side SecTro that receives in XML form the STS-ml dia-
gram and creates a Secure Tropos one. Finally, to sup-
port collaborative work, the exchange and storage of di-
agrams is conducted using a MongoDB database. This
allows multiple stakeholders to have access, modify and
provide feedback to the models they produced.
The software tool is not limited to an integration of
the software, but it permits the usage of one diagram,
for example an STS-ml diagram, as basis for other di-
agrams, for example SecBPMN2, Secure Tropos and
JTrust. This reduces the effort that the users of SePTA
6http://salnitri.faculty.polimi.it/?page_id=327
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will have to dedicate to the analysis and, therefore, will
reduce the probability of errors in the models.
5 Case Study
We evaluated SePTA using a case study approach since
our objective consists of examining the performance of
the method and, therefore, the fulfilment of its require-
ments in a real world context of use [96]. We believe
it is central, for such type of method, to be evaluated
using complex scenarios that are common in real world
sociotechnical systems.
In particular, we opted for a holistic case study with
multiple scenarios [96]. The case study is considered
holistic since we evaluated the overall method; with
multiple scenarios since we performed it using three sce-
narios of different domains. Each scenarios target very
different organisations: (i) a private company, DAEM
S.A.7, which is an IT company that collaborates with
the municipality of Athens in Greece; (ii) a public ad-
ministration, the Italian ministry for Economy Devel-
opment (MiSE)8; (ii) two hospitals, the Hospital In-
fantil Nin˜o Jesu´s9 and Ospedale Bambino Gesu´10. All
organisations used SePTA to analyse parts of their so-
ciotechnical systems. The decision of selecting scenarios
of different domains allowed us to generalise the conclu-
sions of the case study, as it is described in the analysis
about the threats to external validity, later in this sec-
tion.
The case study consisted in an application of the
SePTA method to the three scenarios. For each one, we
selected subjects (among the available employees of the
companies involved) in order to match a typical team
composition of experts that will use the framework, i.e.
a domain expert, a security expert, a privacy expert,
and a trust expert. Due to the low number of subjects
involved in the use case, 2/3 subjects per scenario, we
opted for a qualitative evaluation of SePTA. We con-
ducted interviews with the objective of testing if the re-
quirements of the method, defined in Section 2.3, were
considered fulfilled. The execution was similar for all
scenarios: first the subjects followed a training session
about the method, after that the subjects worked in
team (one for each scenario) and applied SePTA. The
authors of the method helped the subjects correcting
errors in the models created. There was no time limit
on the scenarios execution, neither the scenarios were
executed in the same time frame because of difficulties
of finding common free slots for all the participants.
7http://www.daem.gr/en/
8https://www.sviluppoeconomico.gov.it
9http://www.madrid.org/hospitalninojesus/
10http://www.ospedalebambinogesu.it/home
The results of the empirical experiment hold when
SePTA is applied on systems that correspond on the one
defined in this paper as target of the method, i.e. large
systems with social interactions between autonomous
components (sociotechnical systems). Consequently, we
cannot grant the same performance of the method if it is
applied on a system with different characteristics. Simi-
larly, the main objective of SePTA consists in analysing
security, privacy and trust, therefore, such objectives
were considered in the empirical experiment. Hence, if
the method is used for other purposes, the results of the
empirical experiment might not hold. In other words, if
the SePTA will be used respecting the limitations de-
scribed in the paper, we have a strong confidence that
SePTA will perform as well as the experiment demon-
strated. Furthermore, we believe that the domain of the
analysed system will not influence significantly the per-
formance of SePTA, if the limitations described above
are satisfied, since the empirical experiment was per-
formed in three, extremely different, domains and or-
ganisations.
In this paper we report only the DAEM scenario,
for space issues. For more information on the other sce-
narios, please refer to the technical report [69].
5.1 The DAEM Scenario
Hereby, we present a real world case study provided by
DAEM S.A. The company is responsible for the devel-
opment and maintenance of the Municipality of Athens
Computer Services (MACS), an information system of
MoA that stores and manages personal data of the
Athenian citizens. The main purpose of MACS is to
facilitate the exchange of personal documents issued
by public offices and other organisations that provide
services exclusively to Athenian citizens. MACS is in-
stalled in the premises of the MoA.
The subject of this case study is George, an Athe-
nian citizen, who requests a membership to a sports
facility by using his MACS account, where he can also
apply for a discount. A sports facility requires a birth
certificate from MoA as a proof of residency and a med-
ical certificate from the clinic where the citizen is reg-
istered. Copies of these certificates are sent in a digital
form to the administrator of the sports facility who is
responsible for approving the membership and the dis-
count for George. When George visits the sports facility
for the first time, he receives his badge from the recep-
tionist, which he must present every time he needs to
access the swimming pool. George is also able to mon-
itor his visiting times at each of the facilities he is a
member of. This information can be used by the ad-
ministration of each sport facility for improving their
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quality of service and, as a reward, provide personalised
offers to the citizens for sharing their data. This infor-
mation is recorded every time George enters the facility
and uses his badge. Another service offered by MACS
allows citizens to provide their bank details in order to
set up direct debits for paying their council tax or even
their membership to the swimming pool.
The challenge for PAs to design their system is to
capture the type of information that needs to be trans-
mitted in order for the goals of the involved entities
to be achieved. The PAs also needs to examine how
this information is managed by the different entities.
For example, they must identify what authorisation
each employee has over a citizen’s certificate. In par-
ticular, what employees are allowed to read the cer-
tificates, make copies and to what other entities are
legally authorised to redistribute them. This type of
processes, apart from compliance issues, raises concerns
about trust and security. The PAs must also identify
the weaknesses of their system in terms of trust. For
instance, what is the trust level to the sports facility
for not exploiting the visiting time records or the per-
sonal information of the user for other commercial pur-
poses. Furthermore, PAs must identify potential threats
to the system’s security and design mechanisms to pro-
tect its assets. For example, guarantee that the bank
details of the citizen are safely stored and protected
from cyber attacks. Finally, PAs must verify if defined
early requirements are realised, considering the execu-
tion of their systems, i.e. they must verify if the exe-
cuted business processes, enforce the requirements. Tra-
ditional requirements elicitation approaches render the
design of systems with numerous dependencies. These
interactions are considered as a cumbersome process
for the PAs. Moreover, to the best of our knowledge,
there is no such holistic approach that allows the veri-
fication of the enforcement of such requirements in the
business processes executed in the system. Therefore,
a tool supported method that allows PAs to analyse
the aforementioned aspects is a necessity for design-
ing e-government services and sociotechnical systems in
general, that are compliant with laws, are secure and
trustworthy.
5.2 Applying SePTA
Here we demonstrate how SePTA is applied in the case
study we mentioned above. At each step of SePTA we
present the corresponding diagram and explain the no-
tation used by the modelling language.
5.2.1 STS-ml
STS-ml fits the purpose of this paper since it allows
to specify privacy and security requirements in the in-
teraction of actors of sociotechnical systems, i.e., when
goals are delegated and documents are transmitted.
Figures 2, 3 and 4 show examples of the social, in-
formation and authorisation views for the DAEM case
study. Figure 2 shows an example of the social view. In
this example there are seven actors: there are agents, for
example George, and roles, for example Clinic. Goals are
represented with green squares with rounded corners.
For example, Certificates verified is a goal of SP Information
System, which specifies that the actor has the objective
of verifying certificates. In Figure 2 only the goals of
SP Information System are shown, because of space lim-
itations. A goal is assigned to an actor if it is placed
within its scope, which is represented with a circle that
intersects the actor itself. A goal can be linked to one or
more documents, in order to specify that the achievement
of such goal will imply an operation of the documents.
For example, Certificates verified is linked with a read re-
lation to Birth certificate document, which specifies that
SP Information System will read the document in order
to achieve that goal. There are three types of opera-
tion links: (i) read, which specifies that the document is
viewed only; (ii) modify, which specifies that the docu-
ment is also changed; (iii) produce, which specifies that
the document is created when the goal is achieved.
Social View. The social view allows to specify
AND and OR decompositions of goals, delegations of
goals between actors and transmissions of documents. A
delegation is represented with an arrow from the depen-
der actor to the delegated goal and from the goal to the
dependee actor. For example, Athenian Citizen delegates
the goal Medical certificate issued to Clinic. The transmission
of a document is specified with a similar representation
but with the document in the place of the goal. When
a goal is delegated, appears in the target actor scope in
dark green. Similarly, when documents are transmitted,
they appear in dark grey in the scope of the actor who
received them.
In this view, it is possible to specify a set of privacy
and security requirements in the delegations and trans-
missions. Such requirements are represented with small
boxes under the relations. For example, in the trans-
mission of bank details from Athenian Citizen to SP Informa-
tion System, there are two security and privacy require-
ments: confidentiality, represented with a brown box
with the string Con, and integrity, represented with a
pink box with the string Int. The former specifies that
Athenian Citizen requires that the communication channel
where the document is sent denies unauthorised users
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to read/receive the document. The latter specifies that
the document transmitted should be received without
modifications of its content.
Information View. Figure 3 shows the informa-
tion view. This view is centred on two elements: infor-
mation and document. It allows to specify what informa-
tion is made tangible by a document, i.e. is stored in a
document, and what is the owner of such information.
For example, Name and surname are two Information ele-
ments that are Made Tangible By the documents Medical
certificate and Badge. name and surname are owned by the
Athenian Citizens.
Authorisation View. Figure 4 shows the autho-
risation view, where are specified what operations are
granted to be executed on information. An authorisa-
tion is a relation between two actors and it is composed
of three parts: the operations granted (which are Read,
Modify, Produce and Transmit), the set of information tar-
geted and for which goals the authorisation is valid. For
example, in Figure 4 Athenian Citizen authorises MoA to
Read and Transmit (the green tick on the boxes R and
T) but not to Modify or Produce (the red cross on the
boxes M and P) the information IBAN, Surname, Place of
birth, etc., only to reach goal the Certificates provided.
5.2.2 SecTro
Trust View. The SecTro tool imports the social view
from the STS-ml model. The next step of the SePTA
process prescribes the creation of the Trust view, shown
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in Figure 5. The actors and their goals, as defined in
the STS-ml diagram, are automatically recreated dur-
ing the import. The goal delegations are converted to
Dependencies, which have similar notation in SecTro. For
more detailed analysis in SecTro notation, please refer
to [19].
For our example, there is a dependency of the Athe-
nian citizen on the Clinic to issue the medical certificate
for him. This dependency introduces a potential vulner-
ability as the Clinic may delay in producing the certifi-
cate or, even worse, not produce the certificate at all.
Therefore, this dependency has to be resolved either
through trust (orange parallelogram) or control (red par-
allelogram). Because there is no trust on the Clinic to
do so, the dependency is resolved through control where
the Greek Ministry of Health is the controller and there,
there is an assumption that the Ministry can be trusted.
As this resolution introduces a new dependency now on
the Ministry to control the Clinic, normative trust is iden-
tified as a resolution of this dependency, which assumes
that there is trust on the social norm. From evidence
collected it is shown that it is indeed the social norm
the Ministry to control the Clinic and, therefore, the en-
tailment that the ministry can be trusted to control the
Clinic is true. So, the Clinic will be controlled to issue the
medical certificate once the system is put in operation.
A second dependency of the Athenian Citizen is on the
Administrator of the Swimming Pool to verify the validity of
the medical certificate. Similarly, this dependency intro-
duces another potential vulnerability to the system in the
case where the Administrator does not verify the valid-
ity or maliciously verifies the validity of the certificate.
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Since there is direct experience with the administrator,
experiential trust has been identified as a potential reso-
lution, which assumes the entailment that we can trust
our judgement. This entailment that we can trust our
judgement for the decision on whether the administra-
tor can be trusted is true, as we have had long direct
experience with him in the past.
Security Requirements View. The next step of the
SePTA process is to complete the Security Require-
ments view. From the previous steps, the actors, their
goals and their dependencies are maintained in an au-
tomated fashion. Moreover, the new actor introduced in
the Trust view is also presented along with its goals.
In addition to that, the security and privacy require-
ments defined in STS are converted to Constraints (red
hexagons), as shown in Figure 6. Such constraints are
the Sender Confidentiality and Sender Integrity, associated
with the medical certificate which is created within the
Clinic. The designers and the security experts must now
identify threats to the system. In this case, three threats
are identified. The first threat found is the Man-in-the-
middle threat that impacts the medical certificate that
is exchanged between MoA and the Clinic and the bank
details sent from the Athenian Citizen to the SP Information
System. The next threat identified is tampering that im-
pacts the birth certificate created and stored by MoA and
the bank details provided by the Athenian Citizen. The last
threat is identifiability and impacts the medical certificate
that is stored by the SP Information System. In principle,
the administrators who check the medical certificates of
the applicants shall not be able to identify who is the
applicant.
Attacks View. Now that the threats are identified,
mechanisms (green hexagons) shall be proposed to pro-
tect the system-to-be from any potential harm. To ex-
amine threats in further detail, the designers can create
the Attacks view for each of them. Due to space lim-
itation, hereby, we present the analysis for the Man-
in-the-middle threat, which is shown in Figure 7. In
this case, there are two types of vulnerabilities (red el-
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lipse) detected. First, is the insecure communication channel
through which the medical certificate is transferred from
the Clinic to MoA. Next, the bank details of the Athenian Cit-
izen as well as the medical and birth certificates are stored
in a database, which makes them vulnerable to SQL in-
jection attacks (orange hexagon). For each of the vulnera-
bilities, designers and security experts select appropriate
mechanisms to protect the system-to-be for the potential
attacks. For example, in the case of the Clinic, Mutual
authentication and encryption have been selected as coun-
termeasures to a man-in-the-middle attack.
The mechanisms defined in the Attacks view also ap-
pear within the corresponding actor in the Security Re-
quirements view. Then, each mechanism should be asso-
ciated with the Constraints that satisfies. It is important
to mention that the creation of an Attacks view for ev-
ery threat is not necessary. In particular, for some well
known threats, the designers could propose mechanisms in
the Security Requirements view directly. More specifi-
cally, SecTro offers a pattern library for privacy-related
threats such as Identifiability. The designers can look for
specific threats and directly import and customise a set
of mechanisms that has been proven to work effectively
as a countermeasure.
5.2.3 SecBPMN2
SecBPMN2 is built on top of BPMN 2.0 [59]. Figure 8
shows an example of a business process for the transmis-
sion of medical certificates, specified using SecBPMN2-
ml. In the example, there are two participants, i.e. ex-
ecutors of processes, that are P.MOA and P.SP Informa-
tion System. Each participant contains a process, which
starts with one start event, represented with a green
solid circle, and ends with an end event, which is rep-
resented with a red solid circle. The basic element of a
process is a task, which is an atomic activity. For exam-
ple, Verify completeness of medical certificate is an activity
executed by P.MOA. To specify the sequence of activ-
ities executed, the control flow relation is used. It is
represented with a black arrow which starts from the
precedent element and targets the element executed im-
mediately after. For example, the control flow that con-
nects StartEvent 5 with Verify completeness of medical cer-
tificate specifies that, immediately after the start of the
business process, the activity is executed. The control
flow of a business process can be split with two types of
gateways: (i) parallel gateways, represented with a yellow
diamond with an “+”, that specifies that all outgoing
control flows are executed at the same time; (ii) Exclu-
sive gateways, represented with a yellow diamond with
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an “X”, that specifies that only one outgoing control
flow is executed. For example, only one activity between
Identify missing information and Send medical certificate is ex-
ecuted, based on the outcome of the Complete? question:
if it is Yes then the lower control flow is executed, oth-
erwise the upper control flow is executed. Data objects
represent documents that are read or written by activ-
ities or events. For example, Medical certificate is writ-
ten (represented by an arrow from the activity/event
to the data object) by the event StartEvent5 and read
(represented by an arrow from the data object to ac-
tivity/event) by Verify completeness of medical certificate.
Document can be sent using message flows and mes-
sages. For example, the message M.Medical certificate is
sent from P.MOA to P.SP Information System.
SecBPMN2-ml extends BPMN2.0 with security an-
notations. Such annotations are represented with an or-
ange solid circle, with different icons that specify secu-
rity and privacy concepts. In Figure 8, four security an-
notations are used. Linked to the activity Produce miss-
ing information there are the annotations No Delegation,
which means that the entire activity must be executed
by the specified participant, and No repudiation, which
imposes to keep a legal proof of execution of the ac-
tivity. Linked to the data object there is the integrity
security annotation, which specifies that the document
should be protected from intentional corruption. There
is a confidentiality annotation linked to the message flow
which specifies that only authorised people can receive
and send messages on that channel. For more infor-
mation on SecBPMN2 security annotations please refer
to [75].
SecBPMN2-Q is a modelling language, based on
SecBPMN2-ml, that permits to specify security and
privacy policies, i.e. constraints on SecBPMN2-ml busi-
ness processes. For further information on SecBPMN2-
Q please refer to [75].
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Fig. 7 Example of Attacks view
SecBPMN2 is integrated in SePTA since skeletons
of business processes are generated from STS-ml mod-
els in an automated fashion, while security policies are
automatically generated from security requirements of
STS-ml [74].
5.3 Threats to validity
We analyse the validity of the case study following the
approach described by Yin [91], where four types of
tests are specified. Here, we describe each of these tests
and how we mitigated them.
5.3.1 Construct validity
Construct validity consists in “establishing correct op-
erational measures for the concept being studied” [91].
Yin in [91] suggests to cover two steps:
1. select specific types of changes;
2. demonstrate that the selected measures of the
changes do reflect the specific changes.
For what concerns the first step, we clearly defined the
requirements of the method, that are the criteria to be
evaluated.
The second step is a critical point: since we inter-
viewed the subjects who performed the case study, we
did not perform any quantitative analysis, because of
the low statistical power that the analysis would have
had (2/3 subjects per case study). We indeed preferred
to retrieve as much information as possible with in-
terviews, due to the high effort put in the integration
of SePTA in real word case study: the application of
SePTA on parts of real sociotechnical systems lasted
a few months. However, since we had specific require-
ments, we structured the interviews in order to check if
the requirements of the method were satisfied.
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Fig. 8 Example of SecBPMN2
5.3.2 Internal validity
Internal validity is about the correct deduction of the
results starting from the original data. In other words,
being sure that the treatment causes the changes that
are observed [90]. In order to mitigate the threats to
internal validity we selected scenarios where security,
privacy and trust were central issues, and new func-
tionalities had to be introduced in already present (and
stable from the point of view of the development) so-
ciotechnical systems. This permitted to avoid interfer-
ence that may has be generated from new systems. This
allowed the subjects to be focused only in the parts of
the sociotechnical systems to be analysed with SePTA.
Moreover, we have been careful to give the subjects a
software as stable as possible, in order to avoid them
being (negatively) influenced by software issues. Fur-
thermore, subjects were highly motivated and we had
no mortality, i.e. no subject left, during the execution
of the case study.
5.3.3 External validity
External validity deals with the problem of “knowing
whether a study’s findings are generalisable beyond the
immediate case study” [91]. This is an inherent weak-
ness of using a case study research method since, in-
evitably, case studies are focused on their specific do-
main. In order to mitigate such threat we chose to per-
form three scenarios in three very different domains: one
in an IT company (DAEM), one in a Ministry and one
in two hospitals. The conclusions were conducted con-
sidering the results of the case studies and, therefore,
eliminating issues and interference specific of single do-
mains.
Moreover, we believe that in complex scenarios as
the one targeted by SePTA, in-vitro empirical experi-
ments are not a valid option, since they cannot repro-
duce the complexity of real sociotechnical systems.
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5.3.4 Reliability
A case study is reliable if “a later investigator followed
exactly the same procedures as described by an earlier
investigator and conducted the same case study all over
again, the later investigator should arrive at the same
findings and conclusions” [91]. The DAEM case study
has been detailed in this paper, moreover the three sce-
narios are described, in detail, in a technical report [69].
The reproducibility of the case study is granted by the
diagrams that were defined by the subject and reported
in this paper and in the technical report [69]. Another
research can examine the diagrams and reach the same
conclusions. Unfortunately, the nature of sociotechni-
cal systems is so complex and dynamic that it will not
be possible to recreate the same system and perform
again the case study. However, we are confident that
results will be similar if SePTA will be applied to other
sociotechnical systems, since we applied the method to
three, very different, scenarios.
5.4 Discussion
SePTA enabled software designers and security and pri-
vacy experts to analyse the requirements of sociotech-
nical systems from multiple viewpoints. Thanks to the
inclusion of stakeholders in the process for the design of
SePTA, we had several workshops that led to accurate
feedback from the users. This allowed us to, possibly,
correct the method during its creation and, therefore,
to create a method that satisfies the requirements of its
target users, by design. The users included in the design
process were not included in the evaluation of SePTA,
in order to avoid biased answers.
In particular, for what concerns the requirements (i)
defined in Section 2.3, the method captures the organ-
isational setting of the system-to-be by identifying the
stakeholders involved in it and what are their goals.
Software designers captured the data exchanged within
the system-to-be and modelled in detail the informa-
tion included in this data. This part of the design pro-
cess revealed the security and privacy weaknesses of the
system’s design that required further attention. At the
late requirements phase, software designers along with
the security and privacy experts analysed in detail the
security and privacy vulnerabilities of the system-to-
be and proposed mechanisms to guarantee that such
threats will not put the system’s operation at risk. The
aforementioned two steps are fulfilled with the use of
both STS-tool and SecTro, where the first enables the
elicitation of security and privacy goals and specifies
their operationalisation using secure business processes,
whereas the latter supports an in depth analysis of the
system’s security and privacy vulnerabilities, providing
the means to security experts to propose appropriate
defence mechanisms.
The requirement (ii) defined in Section 2.3, is sat-
isfied using the Trust View of SecTro, which supports
the analysis of the trustworthiness of the dependencies
among actors, satisfying the third requirement of the
PAs.
We consider requirement (iii) satisfied since the
users of the approach can easily switch models to anal-
yse different perspectives of the same system, using the
transformation rules defined in this paper. Indeed, fol-
lowing an iterative process, the user can easily analyse
the system from a social/organisational, security, pri-
vacy and trust perspective, from the abstraction level
of goal-model and business process.
Requirement (iv) is fulfilled by the software we cre-
ated. We maintained the functionalities of the original
software we integrated, in order to provide the verifica-
tion mechanisms already implemented.
Requirement (v) is fulfilled since subjects, during
the interviews, highlighted both the importance of the
holistic perspective offered by the approach proposed
in this paper and the usefulness for the sociotechnical
systems they analysed.
Putting in practice SePTA was a cumbersome pro-
cess. The main difficulty was to train the users of the
tools to use each modelling language correctly. Due to
the rich notation and, in some cases, the lack of exper-
tise in conceptual modelling, the users found initially
hard to design their systems. More particularly, initial
efforts resulted in not fully correct models, since users,
although they possessed domain knowledge, however
they didn’t know how to represent it in the models.
However, after performing a training session for each
modelling language, the users, with the consultancy of
the tool-owners, managed to design their systems using
SePTA correctly. In terms of the understandability of
the models, the tools have the functionality to provide
exploration mechanisms to navigate through the mod-
els, instead of navigating one model. This is achieved
through the existence of various views of the models
that allow users to search and focus on information of
interest and deal with the complexity of the require-
ments models. This feature also supports scalability of
the models [19], as large size models with many nodes
are decomposed to smaller more manageable views. Ob-
viously, the provision of training and consultancy by the
tool owners is not a cost-effective way to develop mod-
els, but once users were trained, they were able to build
meaningful models that could substantially inform the
design of their systems. The users evaluated SePTA in
the scope of the case study, admitting that the pro-
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vided training was effective and the tools assisted them
to improve their design [87].
In a more general approach for the evaluation of the
tools in the context of the presented case study, the re-
sults of which have been presented in [20], the method
for the evaluation followed a systematic approach, com-
bining on one hand the objectives the users set, i.e.
the improvement of users’ security, privacy and trust
when they use PAs services, and on the other hand, the
requirements related to the design of SePTA method.
Each requirement could be technical, and therefore its
fulfilment could be verified by checking the existence
of the functionality(ies) implemented, or could refer to
human perspective, such as usability of the software.
The users evaluated the whole process of the identi-
fication of security, privacy, and trust requirements as
easy, even though they were not familiar with such tools
and methodologies at the start of the project. They
mentioned some difficulties during their first interaction
with the tools, the effort they put in order to integrate
SePTA in their already existing platforms, and in un-
derstanding the functionalities of each tool. However,
they realised the importance of such a method that
should support the services they deliver, since they can
declare they take into consideration citizens’ privacy,
by securing their sociotechnical systems, respecting the
privacy requirements, and by analysing the trust rela-
tionships they have developed with external entities.
Finally, a remarkable comment was that the users con-
sidered SePTA as a method that could act as an addi-
tional trusted layer between the existing services that
the MoA provides to the citizens of Athens, acting as a
facilitator between a public body and a citizen, increas-
ing trust to offered public services.
6 Related Work
There are various different lines of research that are
focusing on trust modelling during the requirements
analysis stage. In [28] the authors extend the Tropos
methodology [10] with the concepts of ownership, trust,
delegation, permission, and monitoring. The concept of
trust is introduced in order to capture the existence or
non-existence of trust in the cases of delegation, since
sometimes actors delegate goals to actors that they do
not trust as long as there are ways to hold such de-
pendees accountable. Similarly to delegation, there is
trust of permission and trust of execution. In the first
case the depender trusts that the dependee will not go
beyond the achievement of the goal, while in the sec-
ond case the depender trusts that the dependee will
at least achieve the goal for him/her. Furthermore, in
cases where there is no trust, the concept of monitoring
is introduced. The act of monitoring can be done by
the delegator himself/herself or by another actor who
plays the role of monitor in order to check the violation
of trust. Through this way, the developer can capture
trust relationships in a normal functional requirements
model. However, compared to our proposed approach,
this work does not support the software engineer in
modelling and reasoning why there is trust and also
how the dependency on the monitoring entity can be
resolved.
The work in [8] extends the Secure Tropos [54]
methodology with the concepts of request, action, trust
relationship, trusting intention, reputative knowledge,
recommendation and consequence in order to model
trust. A trust relationship indicates that one actor ex-
pects another actor to behave in a certain way. Trust-
ing intention is defined as the intent of the trustor on
how far he/she actually trusts the trustee to carry out
the action to her request. Reputative knowledge is the
knowledge that the trustor has about the trustee. Rec-
ommendation is the representation in favour of another
actor while consequence is the effect of a trust rela-
tionship. The developer is guided through a series of
models, using the aforementioned concepts, in order
to analyse and reason about trust relationships. Al-
though this approach provides a mechanism for reason-
ing about trust relationships, it fails to capture indirect
relationships as well. In addition, there are no construc-
tive techniques to guide the design of the system in case
of luck of trust in a dependency.
Another approach [21] proposes a method for dis-
covering trade-offs that trust relationships bring be-
tween trust and control. The method contains seven
steps: identification of actors and their dependencies;
modelling and reasoning of actors’ goals; modelling
trust relationships; recording trust rationale; replace-
ment of the trustee party with a malicious party; anal-
ysis of vulnerabilities; and analysis of the trade-offs.
In this approach the trust modelling techniques from
i* [92] and [28] are adopted and the trust rationale is
captured as a belief from the viewpoint of the depen-
der in order to reveal implicit trust assumptions. Then,
the dependee entity is replaced with a potential mali-
cious entity that has the same access and capabilities
as the legitimate entity. As a result, the developer can
then model and analyse the vulnerabilities and their
impact that the potential malicious entity may bring.
The analysis is a cost/benefit analysis where the cost is
the risks that the malicious entity brings. The aim of
the trade-off analysis is to evaluate if the potential vul-
nerabilities, because of lack of trust in the entities that
have been assigned with goals, outweigh the benefits of
the dependency relationship. If the potential vulnera-
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bilities outweigh the benefits, then the developer can
choose an alternative dependee that offers better ratio
of benefits and vulnerabilities. The costs and benefits
of each alternative dependee are evaluated in terms of
satisfaction or denial of top goals of the depender. In
this approach, the solution is considered to be the iden-
tification of alternative dependee, however, in our ap-
proach we believe that control of the dependee can be
a solution, and thus we provide the required abstrac-
tions that will enable the software engineer to enforce
the fulfilment of dependencies in cases where there is
not trust.
Similarly to our approach, the aforementioned
works focus on modelling trust in social relationships.
However, there are other lines of research such as [94],
[68], [29] that treat trust as a non-functional require-
ment of the system. We consider these approaches out-
side of the scope of our paper.
In addition to trust requirements, there is rich liter-
ature on security and privacy requirements. SQUARE
(Security Quality Requirements Engineering) method-
ology [49] is a risk-driven methodology that supports
the elicitation, categorisation, prioritisation and inspec-
tion of the security requirements through a number of
specific steps. It also supports the performance of risk
assessment to verify the tolerance of a system against
possible threats. The method outputs all the necessary
security requirements that are essential for the satisfac-
tion of the security goals of a system. The methodology
introduces the concepts of security goal, threat, and
risk, but does not consider the assets and the vulner-
abilities of a system. All the required security require-
ments should be identified by the requirements engi-
neering team and the relevant stakeholders.
After the realisation of the importance of privacy
during the development of software systems, the au-
thors of SQUARE methodology adapted their approach
accordingly to support the elicitation of privacy require-
ments at the early stages of software development pro-
cess [7]. The extended framework follows the same steps
as the first approach of SQUARE methodology and it
also integrates a technique that supports the elicitation
and prioritisation of privacy requirements, namely Pri-
vacy Requirements Elicitation Technique (PRET) [52].
However, similarly the approach does note consider the
vulnerabilities of the system and in addition it majorly
depends on a database of privacy requirements that has
to be regularly updated.
In [71] the authors propose the Model Oriented Se-
curity Requirements Engineering (MOSRE) framework
for Web Applications which considers security require-
ments at the early stages of the development process. It
covers all phases of requirements engineering and sug-
gests the specification of the security requirements in
addition to the specification of systems requirements.
The objectives, stakeholders, and assets of the Web ap-
plication are identified during the inception phase. The
final security requirements are elicited after a sequence
of actions that include the identification - categorisation
- prioritisation of threats and system vulnerabilities, the
risk assessment process, the analysis and modelling, and
finally, the categorisation - prioritisation - validation of
the final security requirements. However, this approach
employs UML diagrams to model threats and doesn’t
allow modelling of all security concepts together.
Another approach is the Security Requirements En-
gineering Framework (SREF) [31] which enables the
elicitation and analysis of security requirements. This
framework includes four stages. Firstly, it identifies
functional requirements and afterwards, the security
goals. Continuing, it identifies the security requirements
of the functional requirements. Each security require-
ment satisfies one or more security goals. After these
steps, the framework verifies if the under examination
system satisfies the security requirements. The frame-
work also includes the notion of trust assumptions that
can impact the satisfaction of security requirements but
does not provide guidelines to further analyse those
trust assumptions.
The authors in [1] introduced an asset-based ap-
proach for the elicitation of security goals from business
process models which are then translated into security
requirements. This method follows a sequence of steps.
During the first step, an early analysis is performed
that identifies the business assets that are valuable and
must be protected against security risks. The second
step is dedicated to the elicitation of security require-
ments during the examination of the security risk of
business assets. The final stage is the elicitation of se-
curity requirements which results to the generation of
business rules that satisfy security goals of the system
under examination.
A well-known goal-oriented requirements engineer-
ing approach, KAOS [83] was introduced for the elab-
oration of requirements from high level goals. Excep-
tional agent behaviours, namely obstacles, were respon-
sible for the fulfilment of goals. These obstacles were
identified and resolved through the elaboration of sce-
narios between software and agents, responsible for the
production of a reliable system [86,61]. The KAOS
methodology has been extended [84] in order to elabo-
rate security requirements as well. The output of this
extension is the development of two models. The first
model corresponds to the system-to-be, aiming to de-
scribe the software and the relations between goals,
agents, objects, operations, and requirements. The sec-
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ond model, which is regarded as an ‘anti-model’, cap-
tures possible attackers, their goals, as well as sys-
tem vulnerabilities, in order to elicit potential threats
and security requirements for the prevention of these
threats. The aforementioned security requirements that
the anti-model derives are regarded as countermeasures
and are integrated to the first model.
In [23,24] the authors propose the Problem-
based Security Requirements Elicitation (PresSuRE)
Methodology that facilitates the identification of secu-
rity needs during requirements analysis of software sys-
tems. More specifically, it provides a computer security
threat recognition and the development of security re-
quirements. This methodology uses problem diagrams
to support the modelling of functional requirements.
Firstly, based on its contents, this methodology identi-
fies system’s assets accompanied with the rights of au-
thorised entities. Then, it determines possible attackers
and their abilities. Based on these steps, PresSuRE gen-
erates graphs which depict threats on system’s assets.
Every functional requirement of each asset is related
with possible threats and security requirements.
In the area of privacy requirements, in [17] the
authors present LINDDUN, a privacy threat analy-
sis framework which, in its first release, aimed at the
elicitation and fulfilment of privacy requirements in
software-based systems. The process that LINDDUN
follows is that a data flow diagram (DFD) of the system
is designed and then the identified privacy threats are
related to DFD elements. Privacy threat trees and mis-
use cases are used for the collection of threat scenarios
that might affect the system. Moreover, this methodol-
ogy supports the elicitation of the final privacy require-
ments and the selection of appropriate privacy enhanc-
ing technologies. The final stage of this methodology
is the prioritisation and validation of privacy threats
through risk assessment. LINDDUN also provides a
map that connects privacy enhancing technologies with
each privacy requirement, facilitating thus the system
designers to select the most appropriate techniques that
are able to satisfy privacy requirements.
Similarly, the Privacy Safeguard (PriS) [40], a pri-
vacy requirements engineering methodology, incorpo-
rates privacy requirements into the system design pro-
cess. The authors of PriS aim to cover the gap between
system design and implementation phase. PriS consid-
ers privacy requirements as organisational goals and
through the use of privacy-process patterns in order to
describe the impact of privacy goals to the affected or-
ganisational processes. The next step is the modelling
of the privacy-related organisational processes. These
processes aim to support the selection of the system
architecture that best satisfies them.
Our approach provides a holistic requirements mod-
elling and analysis approach that includes security, pri-
vacy and trust requirements, offering functionalities
that minimise the effort of the systems’ designers, since
they avoid repetition on modelling tasks, while they can
analyse the system from different perspectives.
7 Conclusions
In this work we presented a modelling approach, named
SePTA, that enables software designers and security
and privacy experts to explore multiple aspects of so-
ciotechnical systems in both early and late requirements
phases. More specifically, we interviewed stakeholders
of large Public Administrations and IT companies. The
output of the interviews prescribed that to design soft-
ware supported services in such environments requires
tools that can capture the organisational setting with
specific focus on mitigating security and privacy threats
as well as enhancing the trust relationships among the
components of the system.
Toward this direction, we integrated two CASE
tools, namely STS-tool and SecTro where the first im-
plements the STS-ml and SecBPMN2 modelling lan-
guages, whereas the second implements Secure Tropos
and JTrust. Both tools support multiple views in order
to satisfy the requirements provided by the stakeholders
of our project. STS-tool is used to identify the strate-
gic goals of the entities involved in the system-to-be,
their relationships with each other and what are the se-
curity and privacy requirements of the system. On the
other hand, SecTro is used to analyse in further detail
the security and privacy requirements that have been
elicited with the STS-tool and propose mechanisms to
mitigate external threats and strengthen relationships
among codependent entities of the system.
As future work we plan to include in SePTA an ex-
plicit traceability of privacy and security requirements,
defined in STS-ml and addressed/enforced in SecTro,
JTrust and SecBPMN2. Moreover we will examine the
possibilities of making the notation of the modelling
languages in SePTA more concise to make it easier to
learn for potential users without losing though any of
their expressiveness. Additionally, as part of our re-
search agenda, we plan to add more views to increase
the level of detail of the final design. More specifically,
we will explore the architecture of the system-to-be in
a higher level of detail, combining modern agile ap-
proaches for its derivation such as the Three-Peaks ap-
proach [5] and UMLsec for analysing security and pri-
vacy aspects.
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